Who's Guarding the Flock? Higher Islamic Education in Russia



 

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“I…feel that a priority in the activities of Islamic organizations themselves should be placed on the positive image of traditional Islam as an important spiritual component in the common identity of the peoples of the Russian Federation…this significantly impacts the nurturing of our youth.  This is extremely important for young Muslims, who have, unfortunately, become the target audience of those who wish us harm.”  (Vladimir Putin)[1]

Qolşärif Mosque in Kazan, Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation

by Leonid Kruzhkov (https://www.flickr.com/photos/cust/)

One of the most important function of any church or religion is the education of its clergy.  An educated clergy preserves not only the traditions, beliefs, and ordinances of a religion; it also protects it against radicalism.

Islam’s history in Russia has ancient roots.  The first Islamic missionaries arrived in the seventh century and three hundred years later, around the Tenth Century, the Volga Bulgaria became an Islamic state.  Then, in the Thirteenth Century, the Mongol Golden Horde conquered Kievian Rus’.  This occurred at about the same time that the Mongols began converting to Islam and Berke became the first Islamic Khan.  From this time onward, the Islamic presence on modern-day Russian territory expanded under Mongol rule.

In the Sixteenth Century, the Russian Empire began the conquest of Muslim lands in the Northern Caucasus, along the Volga River, and eastward.  Russian Islam dates from this period.  Widespread state repression characterized the first years of Russian rule over Muslims. However, in order to strengthen her hand against the Ottomans, Catherine the Great revoked restrictions on building stone mosques and other public Islamic buildings in 1767 and issued the decree entitled On the Tolerance of All Religious Confessions in 1773.  This gave Muslims freedom of worship, officially making Russia a multi-confessional state.   

At the time of the 1918 Revolution, thousands of madrassas and other Islamic centers of learning dotted the Russian Empire. In the city of Orenburg alone, there were two specialized secondary theological madrassas, 122 regular madrassas, and 222 maktabs (Islamic elementary schools).[2] The city encompassed a vibrant Islamic community, supported by a cadre of educated imams and other religious personnel.  

Bukhara Kalyan Mosque and Al-Arab Madrassa 
by Patrickringgenberg - Own work.

Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 viaWikimedia Commons

Religious higher education of all confessions suffered under the antireligious policies of the Soviet Government. Islam was no exception. While some Christian educational institutions continued to operate, all Muslim institutions on the territory of present-day Russia were liquidated. Only in 1945 did the USSR Council of Muftis succeed in re-opening the Mir-Arab Madrassa in Bukhar, Uzbekistan. This institute built in the 16th Century, together with the Al-Bukhari Islamic Institute re-opened in 1971 in Tashkent, were the only institutions of higher Islamic education in the USSR. This is why the majority of today’s leading muftis are graduates of Mir-Arab.   

Therefore, until 1988, when the Ismailiya Medrassa was opened as part of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque, there was nowhere on the territory of Russia for students of Islam to study. This meant that many imams did not have a formal education. The lack of institutions of learning meant that during Glasnost, when it became possible open madrassas and institutes, there was a deficit of qualified teachers to staff them.

With Glasnost and the fall of the Soviet Union, not only Christian, but also foreign Muslim missionaries and preachers arrived in significant numbers. Although many of them played a key role in restoring Islam and establishing a new system of theological education in Russia and the former Soviet states, some also advocated a more radical version of Islam historically foreign to Russia. 

To add fuel to the fire, the conflicts in the Northern Caucasus attracted militarized representatives of radical Islamic movements. Militants like the Jordanian Khattab were not only field commanders, but also proponents of radical Islam. Moreover, several of the fighters from the Russian Federation underwent training in Afghanistan and other places, where they learned not only partisan tactics but also the radical teachings of the Islamists there. These Russian Islamist militants have fought in the wars in the Northern Caucasus and other hotspots in the world including Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq supporting Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS. As part of or influenced by these domestic and multinational organizations, they and/or their proselytes have organized terrorist acts in Russia and around the world.  

The rich Arabic states and wealthy private Muslims who sponsored former Soviet students to study abroad were another factor. While this helped rebuild a qualified Islamic clergy in Russia and the other republics, these students often came under the influence of people with radical views or studied at institutions, which taught a more radical interpretation of Islam than was practiced in their homeland. As they returned, they began to teach these ideas to their fellow Muslims. Furthermore, the lack of official recognition of their degrees from these foreign theological programs complicated their ability to integrate into the establishment. This problem has still not been resolved.[3] This left these educated Muslims outside the official system where their education could have been used and adapted to the needs of Russia’s Islamic community.  

Vladimir Putin with the Council of Muftis in Ufa (Kremlin.ru)

Since many Soviet imams could not obtain a formal theological education, they did not have the ability and knowledge to counter these radicals. Therefore these philosophies spread among the lay members. The influence of these people, the spread of imported interpretations of Islam, and the inability of the imams to counter these ideas worried (and continues to worry) the leaders of the traditional Islamic confessions and state authorities. Russian President Vladimir Putin, during a meeting with leading Russian Muftis in Ufa, said:

“Some political forces use Islam, or more specifically its radical movements; which by the way, are not historically representative of Russian Muslims, for the purpose of weakening our state; to establish a zone of conflicts on Russian territory but controlled from outside to cause schisms between the various ethnic groups and within the Muslim community itself and to fan regional separatist tendencies.”[4]

As stated above, there is concern that domestic imams are not adequately prepared to stand up to these radical movements. Maksim Shevchenko, Journalist and Director of the Center of Strategic Religious and Political Studies of the Modern World explained: 



“There is reason to believe that a large portion of imams are entirely not prepared to polemicize with extremists or with people who have fallen under the influence of extremist ideologies. If we make people imams, then we need to select people who can preach, who can engage in intellectual discourse, who are scholars.”[5]

One no less problematic issue is that in the modern world, when Muslims, especially the young, meet with various interpretations of Islam on the Internet, in their travels abroad, or at home; they turn to their spiritual leaders for explanation. If the imam cannot compete with these sources, his disciples will fall under the influence of the more eloquent people or movements. As Mukaddas Bibarsov, Mufti of the Saratov Region explained in April 2014: 

“We live in an age of information technologies, when topics, which formerly were discussed in narrow circles among academics, have become accessible to all. However, not everywhere, including in the Caucasus have we been able to use [these technologies] appropriately. Discussions, quarrels, and dissentions have sprung up leading to the tragic events we see in the region.”[6] 

In order to understand the impact of these new ideas and of the imams’ inability to compete with them, one must also understand the imam’s role in Muslim society. Since Islam is hierarchically decentralized, the imams play a central role in the lives of the congregational members. Some of their main responsibilities include:

• Leading prayers;
• Performing religious ordinances;  
• Mediating family relations;
• Dividing up inheritance;
• Clarifying the fundamentals of Islam and the dictates of Islamic law;
• Counseling the members of the congregation with important life questions.[7]  

In order to fulfill these tasks, especially the latter, the imam must have more than an understanding of the Koran and religious doctrine. He must have a broad general education. During the International Scholarly Applications Conference on the Formation of a Theological Space in Modern Russia held May 31 through June 1, 2012, the Rector of the Moscow Islamic University Damir Khajhetdinov said:

“Today Russian Muslims need not only madrassas but also elite universities, which cultivate better qualified academic cadres and give them a ticket to a successful career…for our overriding goal to create a highly professional Russian Muslim elite possessing both a religious and secular education!”[8]

Furthermore, President Vladimir Putin said:

“One of our most important tasks is the creation of our own Islamic theological school providing sovereignty in the Russian spiritual space and most importantly, being recognized by most of the world’s Islamic scholars. This school must give answers to the most pressing issues in Russia and the world in general, giving opinions that will be understood and authoritative for the believers.”[9] 

The State and the Russian Council of Muftis have invested resources and effort in establishing and improving the Russian Islamic educational system. A large number of madrassas and more than eight Islamic universities are operating in Russia today.[10]  

These institutions teach and graduate a large number of students educated in religious and secular professions. However, as President Putin and Damir Khajretdinov insist, the level of instruction still does not meet international standards and therefore is not yet competitive with foreign institutions. In fact, Damir Khajretdinov suggests that despite financial investments, the quality of theological education has declined since the 1990s. He explains:

“The number of graduates from the institutes during that period [1990s] who became imams was over 50%. However, this indicator has fallen with each passing year. We no longer see students with fire in their eyes, ready to move to distant regions to begin their ministry from nothing: to enlighten, to establish relationships, establish congregations, build mosques, to give sermons.”[11]

In establishing a quality and internationally competitive system of higher Islamic education, Russia comes up against several problems. As long as these problems remain unresolved, Russia will be reliant on other countries to fulfill its obligations to support its own Islamic population religiously.   

First, the education system must answer the needs of life in modern Russian society and at the same time preserve its Islamic spirituality and identity.[12] The complicating factor in this is balance. The imams and educated Muslims must combine a deep spiritual foundation with a broad secular education. This requires close cooperation between the government and religious leaders. Russia has still not found this balance and some, including Damir Khajretdinov; feel that because of Islam’s movement toward decentralization in Russia, the situation has worsened. He explains that this is the result of the diminished role of the Islamic religious leadership in the faith’s universities and their falling under the influence of “third-party external organizations often beholden to local requirements.”[13] The problem is that the Islamic education system remains decentralized and unstandardized.  



Islamic school for orphans (Sasitli, Dagestan)
by АбуУбайда - Own work. Licensed under CC BY-SA 3.0 viaWikimedia Commons -

The second problem touches on the fruits of an effective education system – research and literature. One of the main functions of a healthy educational system is the dissemination of knowledge beyond the walls of the institution through academic publications. In a developed theological-academic community, the scholars study not only the history, traditions, scriptures, and the teachings of their religious fathers but also study the problems and questions that are relevant to their fellow citizens. They publish their research in journals, books, textbooks, and the Internet in articles and video clips. Unfortunately, in Russian Islam the spiritual-academic community is still in the developmental stages, therefore, Russia still imports the majority of its Islamic literature from abroad. Indigenous Russian literature is rare. Consequently, Russians, and Russian Muslims in particular, searching for literature with Islamic answers to questions on life or simply desiring information on Islam frequently cannot find materials that meet their needs and the realities of their life. 

In March 2012, during a meeting of the rectors of the Islamic universities in Moscow, the Chairman of the Russian Council of Muftis Sheik Ravil Gajnutdin described the third and main issue. He “expressed his concern that after years of labor, a unified concept for Islamic education in Russia has still not been created.”[14]   

Although the Committee on Islamic Education has been established and is functioning, this body has yet to establish a standardized system of Islamic education. Furthermore, it has not been able to establish effective cooperation between its member institutions.    

One of the main ingredients of an effective higher education system is an open and interconnected academic and administrative space, which nurtures the effective use of resources and the exchange of ideas and knowledge. Whereas no one institution has all the resources it needs, cooperation can, and in the author’s opinion, should include institutions of other confessions in areas of common interest to all. This will not only conserve resources of individual universities, but can also increase understanding and tolerance between the future spiritual leaders of the various sects.   

Throughout history, religion has played a role in instigating and resolving conflicts. Since they are especially susceptible to radical ideas, the poorly educated often become pawns in these struggles. Their first line of defense is a competent spiritual leader. A well-informed priest, educated not only in church doctrines and ceremonies but also in secular intellectual disciplines, is the best defense against radical religious ideas. Mufti Mukaddas Bibarsov clearly described this concept. He said, “I would like to urge my readers to obtain knowledge because without knowledge, there is no way forward. Life shows that it is not quantity, but quality that counts. Muslims must be educated in all spheres, becoming an example for those around them.”[15] Education is the most important investment a country can make is in its rising generation. In order to become a prosperous country, Russia must resolve these issues, which impact the rising generation of its most vulnerable ethnic communities. As recent events in Russia and around the world involving Islamists from Russia show, her future and indeed the future of our world depend on it.  

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[1] Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich.  Official Page of the President of the President of Russia (Официальная страница Президента России).  Opening Address of the Meeting with the Muftis of the Spiritual Confessions of the Muslims of Russia (Начало встречи с муфтиями духовных управлений мусульман России). 22 October 2013.  Accessed 10 August 2014 <http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/19474>. Translation by author.

[2] The Slavic Legal Center. “The Repressed Madrassa: Interview with Ismail-Khazarat Shangareev, the Mufti of the Orenburg Oblast.” (Славянский правовой центр. Репрессированное медресе. Интервью с Исмагил-хазратом Шангареевым, муфтием Оренбургской области). Issue 1-2 (39) 2006.  Accessed 11 August 2014. In Russian. <http://www.sclj.ru/analytics/magazine/arch/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=1265>.  Translation by author.

[3] Khajretdinov, Damir.  “The Problem of the Development of an Islamic Professional Education Carries a Cross-Functional Education Character” (“Проблема развития мусульманского профессионального образования носит общеобразовательный характер”). 4 June 2012. Accessed 11 August 2014 <http://www.muslim.ru/articles/110/1100/>. Translated by author.

[4] (Putin, Opening Address)

[5] Bejlin, Boris.  VestiFM.  27 September 2013. Accessed 10 August 2014. <http://radiovesti.ru/article/show/article_id/107732>. Translation by author

[6] Tikaeva, Fatima.  Mufti Mukaddas Bibarsov Says That the System of Islamic Education in Russia Must Prepare World Class Muslim Theologians (Система исламского образования в России должна готовить мусульманских богословов мирового масштаба - муфтий Мукаддас Бибарсов). 16 April 2014.  Accessed 11 August 2014 <http://www.muslim.ru/articles/96/5397/>. Translation by author

[7] Islam Today. Muslim Clergy, the Head of the Muslim Congregation (Мусульманское духовенство, глава мусульманской общины). 2014. Accessed 10 августа 2014 <http://islam-today.ru/muslim-clergy/>.  Translated by author.

[8] (Khajretdinov, Damir.  The Problem of the Development of an Islamic Professional Education)

[9] (Putin)

[10] The Intercollegiate Council of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) for Religious Education Portal (Портал межвузовского совета СНГ по духовному образованию). The History and Culture of Islam:  Institutions of Higher Education of the CIS Member States (История и культура ислама - Высшие учебные заведения государств-участников СНГ). Accessed 11 August 2014.  <http://duhobr.ru/Islam/institutions.php?PAGEN_1=2>.  Translation by author.

[11] (Khajretdinov, Damir.  The Problem of the Development of an Islamic Professional Education)

[12] Khajretdinov, Damir.  Innovative Processes in Islamic Education (Инновационные процессы в исламском образовании). 1 December 2013. Accessed 9 August 2014 <http://islameducation.net/article/innovation.html>.

[13] (Khajretdinov, Damir.  The Problem of the Development of an Islamic Professional Education)

[14] ДУМРФ (Spiritual Directorate of Russian Federation Muslims). The Meeting of Russian Islamic University Rectors in Moscow (Встреча ректоров российских исламских вузов в Москве). 23 March 2012. Accessed 10 August 2014 <http://www.dumrf.ru/dumer/event/2931>.  Translation by author.

[15] (Tikaeva)

Shadows of War: Life and the Reality of War in Ukraine

Photo by Forbes.com

(Revised 5 February 2015)

The question in itself was not all that extraordinary, as a father of a large family; friends have frequently approached for advice on parenting.  We had spoken several times on questions of family values and child rearing.

“When do you think we should start having kids?” my young Ukrainian friend asked me. 

I gave the usual answers.  However, his follow-up question left me speechless.

“What about war?” he continued.

I was dumbfounded.  My wife and I had never had to even contemplate that question.  However, for my friend, this was a crucial consideration.  His country was at war.  Crimea had been taken away by “little green men,” the eastern regions of Ukraine were embroiled in armed conflict, and everyone knew someone fighting in the ATO (Anti-Terrorism Operation).  Not only did my friend have to worry about the possibility that war could spread to Kyiv itself, but that he too may need to defend and possibly die for his country.

I told him that honestly, I had no adequate answer.  My country, while at war for over fourteen years in foreign lands, had not seen armed conflict on its soil for over a century.  This was a question I never had to face.  I explained, however, that it is difficult for me to hear about suffering children in war zones.  I immediately see my own children and shudder to think what the child and the parents are going through.

My friend’s question drove home the reality of Ukraine’s crisis more powerfully than any journalistic report ever could.  My friend had been on the barricades of Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square).  His wife, while supporting his actions, feared for his life and on several occasions begged him not to go.  My friend was one of the tens of thousands of the faces we saw on our television screens dressed in makeshift armor facing down Viktor Yanokovich’s elite riot police.  For him the struggle for a truly independent and free Ukraine was not finished.

This dialog with my friend could just as likely have been repeated on the other side of the battle lines, which stretch through the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Eastern Ukraine.  Young couples in Donbas are certainly pondering the same questions as the sound of Grad rockets and artillery reverberate through their cities and Russian troops stream across the border bringing the latest Russian military hardware with them on their “vacation” to Eastern Ukraine and Ukrainian volunteers gather to meet them.

Additionally, the threat to Ukraine’s stability comes not only from Ukraine’s powerful neighbor, or even from those Russia backs in Ukraine’s eastern regions.  It also comes from those who have volunteered to fight for Ukraine’s territorial integrity.  They have made it clear that they had come out to rid Ukraine of not only foreign interference, but even more so, from the dishonesty, corruption, incompetence, and repression of the political and economic “establishment.”  They have made it clear that those they elected to replace their ousted President and his supporters have a limited time to show progress in reforming Ukraine’s corruption ridden political and economic system before they return to set things right by force.  Thousands of battle-hardened and heavily armed fighters could return to Kyiv to bring about the change the politicians have been unable or unwilling to produce.

What was the catalyst of the rebellion and subsequent conflict?  The Western media has portrayed it primarily as a response to Yanukovich’s rejection of the Association Agreement with the European Union.  In fact, the protests against this action were initially relatively small.  It wasn’t until the Berkut riot police of the Ministry of Internal Affairs tried to forcibly clear out the protesters, that Kyiv at first, and within days much of Ukraine, rose up against the president they had elected just four years before.  This misunderstanding in the West is illustrated by the different names the West and Ukraine give the revolution.  The Western press calls the events of November 2013 through early 2014 the Euromaidan Revolution, while Ukrainians call it the Revolutsiya Natsionalyogo Dostoinstva or the Revolution of National Dignity. 

An tale of two squares serves to illustrate the difference in these two terms.  In downtown Kyiv there are two squares located not far from each other – European Square (Euromaidan) and Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti).  The pro-EU opposition parties gathered largely on Euromaidan, while by far the largest protests took place on Maidan Nezalezhnosti.  The Independence Square protesters’ demands were much more varied.  While closer ties with the West were important, grievances against government excesses and corruption were by far more prevalent.  This, more than anything else, illustrates how the Ukrainians themselves see their revolution.  It was a demand for independence, for a restoration of national dignity.

Furthermore, it is illustrative that few of those I spoke to in Ukraine said not signing the Association Agreement motivated them to protest.  While they were disappointed in Yanukovich’s move, they were not ready to revolt to change the President’s mind.  In reality, the spark that ignited the mass action was the television footage of bloodied students being beaten by riot gear-clad Internal Affairs troops, purportedly in order to clear space for a New Year’s tree.  This action brought the growing frustration with government corruption and ineffectiveness, combined with Yanukovich’s increasingly repressive and heavy-handed policies to a boiling point.  Tens of thousands rushed to Maidan Nezalezhnosti, overloading the city’s transportation system.

The frustration with Yanukovich’s policies built on years of disappointment as the people, time and time again, elected “champions of freedom and progress,” only to see them subsequently filling their pockets with the ill-gotten fruits of a corrupt economic and political system.  The heroes of the Orange Revolution Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Timoshenko were not exceptions.  This explains the cool reception Timoshenko received when she appeared on Maidan after her release from prison in February of 2014.  It also explains her limited role today.  She was pro-West, but still part of the establishment.

Yanukovich came to power in 2010 when, frustrated with their fallen Orange Revolution heroes, Ukrainians turned to the man they had rejected in 2004. Unfortunately, the kleptocracy not only continued, but grew and thrived under his rule.  To make matters worse, he filled government posts with people of divided loyalties and began building Putin-like verticals of power and controls over the mass media. 

On the economic front, not only did life for the average Ukrainian not improve, but Ukrainian businesses were sold off to Russian conglomerates and disparities in wealth increased.  Yanukovich’s elaborate “cottage” was a stark reminder of the gulf that separated the average Ukrainian from the power brokers and oligarchs, who ostentatiously flaunt their wealth on the streets of Kyiv with their Bentleys, BMWs, and Ferraris.

These were the reasons my Ukrainian acquaintances gave for rising up against their elected leader and his privileged inner circle.  They were tired of their livelihoods being eroded while Yanukovich and his cronies grew ever richer and cozied up to Putin’s elite at the expense of Ukrainian sovereignty.

The vast majority of protesters were tired of the establishment taking care of its own narrow short-term interests at the expense of the average Ukrainian.  They were tired of being a pawn in the East-West struggle.  They wanted to build a Ukraine that can be prosperous and free of external meddling. 

Is there hope that my friend and his children will see a peaceful and prosperous Ukraine?  I think there is, but that future lies in the hands of the Ukrainians themselves and the path will not be easy. 

After being away for almost five years, the difference in national pride and desire to make a change for the better was palpable.  Kyiv of 2009 was emotionally drained and resigned.  Kyiv of 2015 is energized, proud of what they accomplished and determined that the blood spilt would not have been in vain.

Only by demanding real change can they build a strong and prosperous Ukraine that can stand up for its own interests in the face of outside forces, both from the East and the West.  Right now, Ukraine’s plundered economy can barely support its brave, but battered military, and its outdated factories cannot compete with its modern, high-tech western or even less efficient Russian competitors.  Ukraine needs investment, innovation, entrepreneurship, and leadership.

Consequently, much needs to be done to create an investment and innovation-friendly environment.  Property and labor laws are outdated, many dating back to Ukraine’s Soviet past.  Foreigners cannot buy land, and small business ownership is complicated by corruption and onerous registration rules that not only make it difficult to do business, but also make it almost impossible to close that business and let employees go when things don’t work out. 

An equitable and efficient system of business registration and liquidation are critical to small business.  Whereas many small businesses fail, a reasonable means of exit is vital.  A friend and economic consultant at CASE Ukraine[1]  explained that it may take years to officially close a business.  This results in obligations to pay the numerous licensing and operating fees long after the business has ceased to function. 

Additionally, the Soviet era employee regulations give employees rights to compensation for months, even in cases when they simply stop coming to work.  This, combined with the above issue makes the cost of registering and running a legitimate business higher than operating in the off the radar.

As a result, much of the Ukrainian economy exists in the shadows and its workers are paid “in envelopes,” which leaves businessmen vulnerable to shakedowns by corrupt officials.  This also means that the uncollected taxes the government needs to build effective infrastructure, defense capability, and social supports go instead into the pockets of extortionists. 

While Western governments have pledged financial support to Ukraine, the amounts promised are woefully inadequate.  Ukraine cannot be saved by international aid alone.  The money needed to rebuild her aged and plundered infrastructure outstrips what donors and creditors have promised.  Only foreign and domestic investment can provide the amounts Ukraine needs to create the economy her citizens dream of.  However, those investments will only begin to flow when Ukraine has taken the steps necessary to ensure a safe, secure, and adequate return on investment and to establish an equitable business climate.

I contended in my article “Money to the Winds – Russia’s Capital Dilemma,” [2] with greater risk, capital will expect higher returns.  Absent adequate incentives, capital will avoid risk.  Right now, the Ukrainian system promises plenty of risk with little prospect for adequate returns. 

By meeting the demands of the protesters on Maidan Nezalezhnosti to liquidate corruption and create conditions for legitimate business to prosper, Ukraine can change this situation.  However, the clock is ticking and Ukrainians will not wait forever for the changes they demand.  They have given their current leaders a mandate, but one with conditions and a timeline. 

President Petro Poroshenko inherited a job few would envy – a country wracked by civil war and near financial collapse.  If he is able to do what he was elected to accomplish – eliminating corruption and graft, maintaining territorial integrity, and restructuring the government and economic system – he will go down in history as one of the greatest leaders of our time.  If he cannot, he will take his place on the list of Ukrainian presidents defeated by processes beyond his ability to control.

I have hope for the former and fear the latter.  I hope my friends will be able to build the Ukraine they so ardently desire, one where they can raise their children – a Ukraine where those children will look upon them as that great generation that stood up to corruption and tyranny and built a better nation worthy to take its place among freedom loving democracies.

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[1] http://www.case-ukraine.com.ua/?language=en

[2] http://brentsglobalmind.blogspot.com/2015/01/money-to-winds-russias-capital-dilemma.html